Enhancing Disaster Preparedness and Resilience in FCV Settings – Lessons for Engagement and Investment

In this blog, Dr Gregory Wilson examines the case for leveraging alternative finance for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in FCV settings:

Natural and man-made disasters are becoming more frequent and severe, fuelled by climate change, rapid urbanization, inaction, and intersecting crises such as economic shocks, and exacerbated where conflict and violence are either a lasting legacy or ongoing. Put simply, the effects of fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and disasters are often mutually reinforcing, creating and exacerbating a cycle of human vulnerability. Many of the costs associated with recovery from disasters in low and middle-income countries (LMICs) are currently met by development and humanitarian funds. However, the ALNAP Global Humanitarian Assistance Report 2025 shows a humanitarian sector entering a financial crisis. Simultaneously, the OECD DAC notes international aid fell in 2024 after years of growth. Moreover, the humanitarian ‘reset’ means many humanitarians are going “back to basics”, i.e. a re-focusing on life saving activities.  This makes the oft-discussed ‘nexus’ increasingly hard to achieve despite humanitarian tools widely recognised as the wrong tools for sustainable DRM.

The significant falls suggest that we need to look again at how to leverage alternative finance for Disaster Risk Management (DRM) in FCV settings

We suggest there is a significant need, but also the opportunity to expand investments in emergency preparedness.

Disasters are staggeringly expensive to the world economy. The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) 2025, highlights how direct disaster costs have grown to approximately $202 billion annually, but that the true costs of disasters may be over $2.3 trillion when cascading and ecosystem costs are considered. The EU calculates that from 1980 to 2022, natural hazards affected millions of people and cost Member States €650 billion.

Disasters are staggeringly expensive to the world economy

The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) 2025, highlights how direct disaster costs have grown to approximately $202 billion annually, but that the true costs of disasters may be over $2.3 trillion when cascading and ecosystem costs are considered. The EU calculates that from 1980 to 2022, natural hazards affected millions of people and cost Member States €650 billion.

The Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (GAR) 2025, highlights how direct disaster costs have grown to approximately $202 billion annually, but that the true costs of disasters may be over $2.3 trillion when cascading and ecosystem costs are considered. The EU calculates that from 1980 to 2022, natural hazards affected millions of people and cost Member States €650 billion.

However, for LMICs, the reduction in donor grant funding for emergency preparedness has had significant impact

Notably, the Trump Administration has followed through with its threats to reduce the aid budget of the USA. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) has been dramatically affected by sweeping budget cuts and restructuring efforts in 2025. USAID has seen over 90% of its programmes terminated, with funding slashed by nearly $60 billion. Aside from the extreme politically driven action by the Trump Administration, other donors are also cutting development assistance as their national budgets come under pressure. Many projects funded by other donors are being curtailed at short notice. The reductions have had global consequences, including cuts to programmes that would enhance countries’ abilities to forecast natural disasters, respond to weather-related events like droughts and typhoons, and build resilience to minimize displacement or economic shock when those events happen.  The impact in situations of fragility and conflict will be multiplied. The debt and economic losses associated with disasters inhibit the potential for economic growth and in turn, foster instability.  The reinforcing negative cycle of weak economy, weak social contract, increased vulnerability and occurrence of disasters reinforces the weak economy. The cumulative impact of these cuts is that people will face worsening disasters, with less capacity to respond and fewer resources to prepare. Ultimately, many will be forced to leave their homes and communities. A new approach is needed to arrest this negative cycle that locks people into significant poverty.

In the context of falling development and humanitarian budgets, how will disaster risk management (DRM) and its financing fare?

Prior to the recent reduction in aid budgets there was already a very clear need to leverage development finance for DRM in FCV settings, but also to ensure sustainability of the identified investment recommendations.

Not so long ago, we undertook a comprehensive analysis of the main characteristics of the strategies and policies that the different Multilateral Development Banks MDBs and Development Finance Institutions (DFIs) have developed to address fragility and conflict. The lessons we identified from these financial institutions can help us to understand how to frame recommendations for investment in FCV settings. Not exclusively to enhance disaster preparedness or resilience, but more concerned with understanding and framing our decision-making in FCV situations.

We identified 14 key issues that are recognised to drive and exacerbate fragility and conflict globally:

  1. Conflict and violence;
  2. Forced displacement;
  3. Natural disaster and climate change;
  4. Gender inequality;
  5. Exclusion of youth;
  6. Serious organised crime and corruption;
  7. Violent extremism;
  8. Rapid and unregulated urbanisation;
  9. Poverty,
  10. Inequality and exclusion;
  11. The burden of debt accumulation and economic shocks;
  12. Weak institutions and poor governance
  13. Human rights violations
  14. Public health crises and pandemics such as COVID-19 and Ebola

Any investment approach in FCC is likely to interact with these aspects, be impacted by them and potentially have both positive and negative impacts on them (intended and unintended).

A number of key lessons or recommendations for framing investment in FCC were identified from the review and analysis of MDB/DFI strategies and work in FCV settings. We have related these lessons to the challenges of FCV situations and DRM.

  1. The critical need to develop a deep understanding of local contexts and differentiating between different contexts. The way that fragility and conflict manifests in particular situations is context specific. Understanding the short- and medium-term future developments and risk evolution, is key to effective policy and programme development. Seek clarity on understanding context using appropriate diagnostics.
  2. Improv diagnostics and utilise the potential of Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Machine Learning (ML)
  3. Promote the inclusion of marginalised groups and listening to a diversity of voices is key to preventing and responding to fragility. Include marginalised groups in decision making as a driver of resilience, because it reduces the risk of discontent and increases the chance that decisions reflect the needs and desires of all individuals, rather than an elite few. This type of inclusion should involve women, youth, ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, members of the LGBTQI+ community, and other marginalised groups.
  4. Where appropriate, promote community ownership to improve the sustainability and relevance of initiatives. The localisation of Early Warning Systems (EWS) and anticipatory action can be strengthened by identifying existing barriers, challenges, and best practices.
  5. Adopt partnership approaches with other development institutions to improve coordination and maximise impact and ensure additionality. The importance of strategic partnerships, with civil society (especially women and youth organisations), private sector, non-governmental organisations, and other specialised actors working across the development, humanitarian and peacebuilding spectrum, to support transitions from fragility to resilience. The importance of partnering with organisations on the ground with significant local knowledge, is key to design interventions that facilitate development while also building trust and consensus and fostering cohesion and reconciliation.
  6. Use investments to simultaneously increase focus on prevention efforts rather than engaging only in times of crisis. Identifying and targeting context specific root causes of violence and conflict, and supporting structural conflict prevention by supporting inclusive politics, economies and societies
  7. Be flexible in the approach to identifying and applying specific products in recognition of the hyper-complex contexts in which they work, so they are better able to respond quickly and sequence interventions. It is hard to do ‘business as usual’ in deeply fragile and conflict-affected situations
  8. Strengthen specific in-house capacity in terms of staff specialised in fragility, conflict and resilience-building.
  9. Build an enhanced field presence in, or close to, the communities we support
  10. Maintain a strong focus on crisis preparedness, preparedness and crisis emergency response at all times. Crisis response may be needed at any time. There is a clear economic case for avoiding damage to already weak economies

If we agree that there is a need to leverage development finance for DRM in FCV settings, what does this mean for prioritising investments in Disaster Preparedness in FCV situations?

  1. The binary humanitarian – development envelopes that we have now are not fit for purpose to address DRM, even more so in FCV settings. Should we be calling explicitly for different types of funding streams for DRM in FCVs?
  2. Countries experiencing FCV generally have extremely little fiscal space to address financing needs. Many countries response to disasters is significantly constrained by their limited domestic revenue. We need to understand how the government’s budgets are structured – whether there is a Contingency Budget allocated only for conflict related events. Is there a National Disaster Response Fund? What is the status of disaster risk finance (DRF) instruments? For those countries that have achieved the HIPC Initiative Completion Point there may be new opportunities for accessing international finance.
  3. Is there scope to go significantly beyond emergency relief, “Action not Reaction”? – Increasing focus on financial resilience and preparedness. Examples include the World Bank’s Disaster Risk Financing and Insurance Program (DRFIP), the EU Civil Protection Mechanism supports EU countries and participating states in disaster prevention and preparedness and provide a Technical Assistance Facility too. KfW is supporting innovative drought insurance for emergency aid organisations in Africa – the “African Risk Capacity drought insurance”.  EIB Global is looking at how they can incentivise investments prior to the occurrence of a disaster or emergency, including by providing technical assistance that identifies potential risks and builds a pipeline of prevention and preparedness investments.
  4. Who will pay to utilise advances in AI and Machine Learning (ML) to support remote sensing and hazard mapping? ML has to be trained with adequate amounts of contextual information to allow accuracy verification of ML generated outputs; to minimise algorithmic bias and the misclassification of features. All in a situation of limited geoinformatics expertise and very high data costs
  5. What potential is there to invest in Forecast Based Financing (FbF) to sustain proactive disaster preparedness. FbF is pre-agreed finance for pre-agreed activities to prevent or mitigate the impact of an imminent hazardous event or shock when forecast triggers are reached. What is the scope for prearranged funding through insurance (risk transfer) and anticipatory action (AA) programmes? With the inevitable reduction in funding for humanitarian and development projects, there will inevitably be an impact on anticipatory action financing by development and humanitarian partners, further increasing pressure to scrutinise and prioritise investments
  6. Can we afford to strengthen Multi Hazard Early Warning Systems (MHEWS), integrating indigenous/local knowledge with modern technologies such as AI and machine learning? How can we embed EWS into national disaster risk reduction policies? What scope is there for linking into other ‘resilience’ programming? Realistically most DRM of any scale and sustainability needs to be channelled through the government, but the nature of FCV settings means the social contract is frequently weak. So how can trust be built to enable and ensure that DRM mechanisms and the necessary community mechanisms are complimentary?

Conclusion

The world is unfortunately becoming more reactive and less prepared, FCV situations bear the brunt of these intersecting ‘crises’, exacerbated by the current funding crisis. With climate change accelerating the frequency and intensity of disasters, and the incidence of conflict on the rise, the time is right to look again at financing for DRM in countries facing fragility and conflict.

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