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In this blog, Dr Gregory Wilson, Developmentum Director, explores the potential of a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) to frame and guide progress on Gaza reconstruction and recovery. A MAF is a structured partnership in which all parties commit to concrete, reciprocal obligations and agree to be held accountable for delivering on those commitments. Such frameworks have precedent in other conflict and post-conflict settings. A Mutual Accountability Framework for Gaza is politically fraught, technically complex, and will demand compromises that every key actor may prefer to avoid. Yet the alternative is tragically predictable: another cycle of devastation, another generation radicalised, wider MENA instability. and another strategic failure for all involved. The obstacles to a MAF-style are immense, but the cost of inaction is greater. Only a structure that binds all parties to clear, reciprocal commitments; restores Palestinian agency; embeds regional and UN legitimacy; and delivers real security for Israelis and real dignity for Palestinians offers even a chance of breaking the logic of recurring war.
The passage of UNSC Resolution 2803 provided a mandate for an international stabilisation force. It “Authorizes Member States working with the BoP and the BoP to establish a temporary International Stabilization Force (ISF) in Gaza to deploy under unified command acceptable to the BoP1, with forces contributed by participating States, in close consultation and cooperation with the Arab Republic of Egypt and the State of Israel” (para 7)
The Resolution was an attempt to give shape to the plan for peace and has indicated a vague hope for an eventual road to Palestinian Statehood. Gaza lies in ruins after the most devastating violence in decades, with the entire population displaced multiple times and over 70,000 people killed. 300 Palestinians have been killed since the “ceasefire” was established. There is no ceasefire in the West Bank and the de facto annexation of the West Bank to Israel continues on a daily basis; plans for the E1 settlement would separate East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. By opening the Rafah crossing for Gazans, but placing restrictions on entry and exit, Israel has already broken the terms of the Resolution (Annex 1, para 12). At the time of writing the asymmetry between the parties and the dominant role of the United States are such that it is generally assumed that this conflict is exceptional and because of the underlying allied impunity enjoyed by Israel in real terms – the application of learnings from other precedents is to an extent redundant. We believe this proposition provides the basis for a self-fulfilling prophecy: so long as this asymmetrical conflict is treated as unique it will continue to heavily favour Israel. Even though the Palestinian State does not have the agency in the current process to challenge that process, the international community should continue to support the New York/Arab process which placed Palestinian agency at the centre and should continue to map out alternative processes that if applied would be more likely to provide the conditions for a lasting peace rather than being the basis for new rounds of violence. It is in this spirit that we offer this analysis of the application of a Mutual Accountability Framework to be applied Israel-Palestine.
Past peace initiatives have faltered, due in large part due to a lack of accountability on each side’s obligations to end hostilities and the inherent power asymmetry between Israel and Palestine makes this likely to be the result of the current process. Moreover, there is an imbalance where some parties’ commitments are enforced whilst other parties’ commitments go unchecked. To break this cycle of distrust and recurring violence, we propose the drafting and agreement of the parties to a comprehensive but implementable Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) as a cornerstone for future peace and stability in Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem.
A Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) is a structured partnership in which all parties commit to concrete, reciprocal obligations and agree to be held accountable for delivering on those commitments. Such frameworks have precedent in other conflict and post-conflict settings2, where they aligned local authorities and international supporters around shared goals and objectives. Sometimes also referred to as ‘Compacts’, they have had variable success but have been supported by the international community. Applied to the Israeli Palestinian context, a MAF would bind Israel, Palestinian authorities, and international stakeholders to a set of agreed actions, from security measures and governance reforms to humanitarian relief and economic support with progress monitored independently. This approach would reassure each party that individual concessions will be met with tangible reciprocal steps, rebuilding trust over time.
A Mutual Accountability Framework should draw explicitly on lessons from past compacts and MAFs in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone, and Liberia by keeping commitments few, realistic, and reciprocal; embedding robust, independent monitoring; and ensuring transparency through public reporting. It should include clear, paired incentives so that every Israeli, Palestinian, and donor action triggers a corresponding, verifiable response, and it must formally integrate civil society to build legitimacy and public trust. The framework should be inclusive in design, flexible enough to adjust to fast-changing conditions, and grounded in a long-term, iterative process rather than a one-off agreement. It must be rooted in broadly accepted principles of inclusive and sustainable economic growth and development. If the power dynamics and the politics of Israel could one day be aligned to allow for the development of a MAF then this kind of approach would enhance the feasibility, credibility, and impact of the proposed MAF.
The MAF would need to have tracks to cover security, political commitments, governance, representational democracy and equitable elections, human rights and rule of law. The BoP would monitor the framework supported by an independent secretariat. A baseline will need to be established and suitable milestones agreed upon.
The ongoing war in Gaza, coupled with escalating violence in the West Bank, has reinforced the urgent need for a fundamentally new approach to resolving the conflict. Since October 7th, 2023, Gaza has experienced an unprecedented humanitarian disaster, mass civilian casualties, widespread destruction of critical infrastructure, and repeated displacement of its entire population. In parallel, the West Bank has witnessed its most lethal conflict period in decades, marked by intensified Israeli military operations, increased settler violence, and growing instability. The Palestinian economy stands on a precipice. Israeli civilians have also suffered significant loss of life, beginning with the Hamas attacks of October 2023 and continuing through subsequent incidents.
This crisis reflects a long-standing cycle in the case of Gaza: large-scale violence followed by international pledges for reconstruction, only for gains to be compromised by recalcitrant behaviours on all sides and then reversed by renewed conflict. Diplomatic efforts have similarly stagnated. The Oslo Accords lacked mechanisms for mutual accountability, enabling continued settlement expansion, recurring violence, and deepening distrust. Time and again, past agreements have been subverted and directed only towards ‘reforming’ Palestinian politics and institutions and rarely focused on the fundamental power asymmetry between Israelis and Palestinians. As a result, attempts to advance peace have failed to alter the underlying dynamics.
Gaza now faces a fundamental reconstruction challenge, while the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank grapples with deteriorating human security, political fragmentation, diminished public legitimacy, and economic meltdown. As things currently stand, there is no provision or mechanisms in place to protect the lives and properties of Palestinians from violence by Israeli soldiers or settlers. Without a substantive shift in strategy, away from the asymmetric, and fundamentally one-sided accountability mechanisms, there is a risk of further descent into chaos.
This is the backdrop for our proposal of a Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF). The concept of mutual accountability has gained traction in international development and post-conflict recovery because it addresses a fundamental problem: the breakdown of trust. In contexts from Afghanistan to Somalia, stakeholders learned that only by tying each side’s actions to the others can durable progress be made. This is clearly also the fracture line that runs through the current Trump process. The remainder of this paper will explain what mutual accountability means in practical terms, why it is especially critical for Israelis and Palestinians now, and how an outline of such a framework could be constructed for Gaza, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem. The goal is to move beyond managing a humanitarian crisis, and the immediate insecurity on all sides, and instead establish a foundation of shared responsibility and concrete obligations that can underpin a long-term peace. This is not a call for final-status negotiations or a comprehensive peace deal overnight – rather, it is an essential step to create the conditions in which real peace negotiations can eventually take root. By insisting on mutual commitments and independent oversight, we can begin restoring confidence that has been missing for decades.
A Mutual Accountability Framework (MAF) is a nationally led, country-specific compact-style mechanism that brings together statebuilding, peacebuilding, and development actors to agree collectively on shared priorities, implementation responsibilities, mutual obligations, and funding commitments. Like compacts, MAFs have no single blueprint; they are designed around a national vision and context, aligning external support behind a common set of political, security, and development goals
A MAF establishes a unified framework through which both the host government and donors commit to delivering specific, measurable objectives, typically combining domestic policy reforms and international financial or technical assistance. This dual set of obligations often functions as a structured form of conditionality, embedding reforms within a predictable and coordinated support architecture. In more comprehensive forms, MAFs coordinate and align multiple peacebuilding and statebuilding reforms across institutions and partners, with the UN often playing a central role in facilitating design and implementation.
MAFs have been central instruments in a number of fragile and post-conflict settings, including Liberia, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, and Timor-Leste, where they have served as formalised agreements to advance reforms, support national priorities, and strengthen mutual accountability between governments and international partners. (Bennett, 2012; IDPS, 2013).
Mutual accountability means that all parties in an agreement are accountable to each other for fulfilling their commitments. In concrete terms, it is a framework that binds stakeholders to reciprocal obligations: each party agrees to take certain actions (for example, policy reforms, security measures, or provision of aid), and in return expects the others to uphold their end of the bargain. This two-way and in the case of Gaza, three-way accountability, is fundamentally about partnership. It stands in contrast to one-sided demands, conditionality or unsecured promises which might enforce ceasefires but do not bring lasting peace.
In international aid and peacebuilding practice, MAFs have emerged to foster a more balanced partnership between all parties. Rather than donors simply dictating conditions, all sides agree on a set of goals and share responsibility for achieving them. For instance, a national government might commit to governance reforms and anti-corruption measures, while international donors commit to providing a certain level of funding and technical support. Progress is jointly monitored against agreed benchmarks. In the case of Gaza, the emphasis has to be across multiple tracks – security, political, reconstruction and recovery, fiscal stability, etc. aligning everyone behind one plan. A MAF would mean that Israel, the Palestinian leadership (including both the PA and representatives from Gaza), and international stakeholders collectively agree on a roadmap of reciprocal steps. Each step by one party is explicitly linked to a step by another. Donors would tie their financial and political support to both states, Israel and Palestine and their support to these steps, ensuring that political support and funds flow when conditions are met and are withheld or reprogrammed if commitments are breached. Over time, this creates a pattern of exchange of good faith actions. Instead of open-ended promises or unilateral demands enforced by violence.
Mutual Accountability is based upon equality, shared outcomes, behaviours, and actions. At the time of writing the asymmetry between the parties and the dominant role of the United States are such that it is generally assumed that this conflict is exceptional and because of the underlying allied impunity enjoyed by Israel in real terms – the application of learnings from other precedents is to an extent redundant. We believe this proposition provides the basis for a self-fulfilling prophecy: so long as this asymmetrical conflict is treated as unique it will continue to heavily favour Israel.
Israel’s government, led by PM Netanyahu, remains firmly opposed to any arrangement that could lead to a Palestinian state or transfer meaningful sovereignty to the PA in Gaza or the West Bank. Security concerns dominate Israeli thinking after the 2023–25 war: Hamas and Islamic Jihad must be fully disarmed, Gaza must never again pose a military threat, and Israel insists on retaining influence over Gaza’s security environment—especially borders, airspace, and coastal access.
Israel is therefore wary that an international force or PA-led authority may be too weak to prevent a Hamas resurgence. Any transition compact that dilutes Israeli control too quickly, limits Israeli freedom of action, or pre-commits to political outcomes (e.g., Palestinian statehood) will face strong domestic resistance. With roughly 70% of Israelis reportedly opposing Palestinian statehood, no Israeli leader will embrace a framework seen as constraining Israel’s security choices.
To gain Israeli acceptance, a Mutual Accountability Framework would need to foreground security guarantees:
In short, Israel may accept a MAF but only if it locks in permanent security calm, preserves Israeli deterrence, and offers geopolitical rewards, while avoiding any immediate concessions on Palestinian sovereignty. From Israel’s perspective, they believe that have changed Hamas’s calculations and pushed them to release the hostages and agree to the ceasefire. But the US enforcement of that ceasefire means that Hamas remain an actor with at least 20,000 armed fighters. Either Israel needs to restart the war or it needs to take part in a process which brings it security. A MAF would explicitly tackle this concern. Because Hamas commitments would be tied to Israeli actions, Israel would gain assurance that concessions it makes such as easing border closures or restraining military operations are conditional on sustained calm. If violence resumes, the framework will allow Israel (with international backing) to pause or reverse its measures, linking performance to outcome.
Moreover, a MAF could bring the international community in as a guarantor of Israeli security concerns. With donors and major powers co-signing the framework, Israel would not have to rely solely on bilateral trust. This would necessitate Israel supporting the work of third-party monitors at Gaza’s borders and in the West Bank as well as international technical advisors embedded in Palestinian security forces, as part of the mutual commitments. It would also provide the platform for regional powers to play a direct role in underpinning the keeping of promises on the Palestinian side. This reduces the burden on Israel to “just trust” promises, there would be verification. There is also a diplomatic and reputational incentive for Israel. Embracing mutual accountability would signal that Israel is serious about a new, fair-minded approach, which could improve its strained relations with European and regional partners. It demonstrates willingness to be held accountable to commitments3, rather than insisting only Palestinians be held accountable. This could in turn unlock more international support for Israel’s own needs, such as recognition of its legitimate security concerns and perhaps additional economic partnerships, because it would be seen as a cooperative player in a rules-based process. Engaging in the process would also signal an acceptance of parity of esteem with the Palestinians, a seemingly impossible move in the context of current Israeli politics but also one that is necessary for lasting peace and coexistence.
For the Palestinian Authority (PA): Opportunity to Return, Tackling the Burden of Low Legitimacy:
For the Palestinian Authority and citizens, the status quo has been one of unfulfilled promises and ever worsening conditions. A MAF would be central to ensure that their core concerns, delivering humanitarian aid, ending the endless economic and political blockades, stopping settlement expansion, a halt to financial and economic strangulation, are not perpetually postponed.
The PA publicly supports Resolution 2803 and sees the Gaza ‘Transition’ as a chance to reclaim governance lost to Hamas since 2007. Controlling Gaza would restore its status as the sole legitimate Palestinian authority and give it access to major reconstruction funds. But the PA suffers severe credibility and capacity problems. Moreover, without a functioning legislature, unclear succession rules and deep factional rivalries, the post-Abbas era could tip the whole system into chaos. There have been no elections since 2006, widespread perceptions of corruption, and limited popular trust in Gaza. However, The PA will resist any plan that bypasses it or gives Hamas political space. It insists on “one authority, one gun,” meaning no parallel armed groups. Yet it privately fears inheriting an unmanageable security and humanitarian crisis.
To secure PA buy-in, the MAF must:
For Hamas and Other Gaza Factions: Military Defeat, Political Survival
Hamas publicly rejects Resolution 2803 as foreign “guardianship” and refuses full disarmament. Though militarily degraded, it remains organised and could wage an insurgency if excluded. Its political wing may still seek a deal if disarmament comes with safety guarantees and space for political relevance. Other factions (especially PIJ) present additional spoiler risks, often backed by Iran. For an MAF to succeed, Hamas must be neutralised or co-opted:
Hamas will never endorse a U.S.-led plan publicly, but de facto acquiescence is possible if life improves, political horizons re-open, and its survival depends on adaptation rather than resistance.
Under the MAF, every step the Palestinian side takes would be directly linked to an Israeli action or an international guarantee. This means, for example, if the PA undertakes a difficult reform, such as overhauling its security forces or cracking down on illicit weapons in Gaza, there is a guaranteed payoff such as Israel opening a border crossing wider or transferring withheld tax revenues, not empty rhetoric. This would mark a dramatic shift from past experiences where Palestinians felt they upheld security cooperation or governance reforms but saw little easing of the occupation in return.
Just as importantly, the MAF would hold Israel accountable for its obligations, backed by international witnesses. Palestinians have long suffered from a lack of enforcement when Israel reneges on commitments such as ensuring past reconstruction efforts could proceed with out impediment. In this framework, Israeli commitments to restrain military incursions, control settler violence, or stop demolitions in East Jerusalem would be tracked with the same rigour as Palestinian commitment. Any failure by Israel to deliver would be called out in the joint monitoring forums, giving Palestinians a diplomatic lever and a validation of their grievances. This mutual scrutiny is essential for restoring Palestinian faith in any peace process. It assures them that their compromises (like committing to non-violence or recognizing Israel’s security needs) will actually yield progress toward freedom, rather than being pocketed while occupation deepens.
The U.S. spearheaded Resolution 2803 and wants to demonstrate a major diplomatic achievement: neutralizing Hamas, securing Israel, and stabilizing Gaza. It prefers maximum control with minimum UN interference, but needs Arab, PA, UN, and donor cooperation to succeed. Constraints include a strong pro-Israel domestic base, aversion to open-ended missions, and the approaching 2028 election cycle. The U.S. will resist anything that appears to reward Hamas or diminish American leadership.
An MAF can win U.S. support if it:
The U.S. will accept a more multilateral MAF if it strengthens—not weakens—the effectiveness of the Trump plan.
The UN backed Resolution 2803 but was effectively sidelined operationally in favour of a U.S.-led Board of Peace. Russia and China criticized this, and many UN actors are uneasy with the lack of explicit reference to 1967 borders, occupation law, and Palestinian rights. The UN’s priorities remain protecting civilians, ensuring humanitarian access, maintaining legal continuity and the presence of UNRWA, and anchoring Gaza’s transition in the two-state framework. A viable MAF would:
UN involvement strengthens legitimacy and maintains alignment with international norms.
These donors support the ceasefire and want sustainable reconstruction tied to two-state parameters. They will contribute funds but expect transparency, anticorruption guarantees, and multilateral governance. They worry about being sidelined by U.S. unilateralism and about funding a de facto trusteeship without political progress. For them, a MAF must therefore:
If donors see transparent governance and real Palestinian ownership, they will maintain large-scale commitments.
Egypt wants a stable, non-militarised Gaza governed by Palestinians, not foreigners or Islamists. It insists on a short transition, a strong PA role, and a clear path to Palestinian statehood. It will support the MAF if it preserves Egyptian influence, avoids refugee flows into Sinai, and keeps Turkey/Iran at bay. Qatar wants humanitarian relief and some political space for Islamist actors. It will help restrain Hamas if the framework offers dignity, amnesty options, and avoids total political exclusion. Its aid networks make it indispensable. Saudi Arabia wants progress on Palestinian rights to justify eventual normalization with Israel. It will fund reconstruction heavily if the process strengthens the PA and leads toward two states.
Regional support for the MAF requires:
With regional alignment, the MAF gains legitimacy and enforcement power.
The international community including Western donors like the US, EU, UK, and regional actors like Egypt, Jordan, and the Gulf states have poured enormous resources into this conflict over decades, with frustratingly little to show for it in terms of lasting peace. Infrastructure funded by these donors, including the United States, has been successively destroyed by the IDF. The mutual accountability framework is attractive to these stakeholders because it promises better returns on their engagement. Donors will no longer be writing blank cheques or funding reconstruction that will be destroyed again. Instead, aid and political support will be tied to clear conditions, ensuring that their investments lead to real change on the ground. For example, an agreement might stipulate that donor funds for rebuilding Gaza’s power grid are disbursed only as Israel permits the needed materials and cedes full control over the grid to the Palestinian side who, in turn, create a robust mechanism to prevent theft or misuse of those materials.
Neighbouring countries, Egypt and Jordan face direct fallout from Gaza and West Bank instability. They too would benefit from an MAF that gradually stabilises Gaza, Egypt’s main concern. Jordan is concerned with maintaining the holy sites and discouraging displacement of Palestinians. By participating in the framework e.g. Egypt helping to monitor the Rafah crossing, these neighbours gain a seat at the table to protect their interests and contribute to solutions. Internationally, the conflict continues to be a major source of global tension, improving everything from global security cooperation to reducing extremist propaganda that exploits this conflict. International stakeholders gain accountability, effectiveness, and a pathway to exit the cycle of crisis response. Their money and diplomacy go further, and they help fulfil both humanitarian obligations and strategic interests (like countering terrorism and managing migration) through a stable outcome.
In sum, developing a Mutual Accountability Framework for Gaza is politically fraught, technically complex, and will demand compromises that every key actor with dominant power – Israel and the US and even those who are weaker: the PA and Hama and other Palestinian factions/remnants, would prefer to avoid. Yet the alternative is tragically predictable: another cycle of devastation, another generation radicalised, wider MENA instability. and another strategic failure for all involved. The obstacles to designing a MAF are immense, but the cost of inaction is greater. Only a structure that binds all parties to clear, reciprocal commitments; restores Palestinian agency; embeds regional and UN legitimacy; and delivers real security for Israelis and real dignity for Palestinians offers even a chance of breaking the logic of recurring war. The MAF is not a luxury, it is the minimum viable architecture for preventing Gaza’s collapse into renewed violence. If this, or something like it, is not developed, the region will inevitably return to the familiar and deadly pattern of eruption, repression, and ruin. The political risks of trying are high, but the human, strategic, and moral risks of not trying are far higher.
The MAF would directly address the critiques of Resolution 2803. Palestinian leadership and equity is placed front and center, all parties’ obligations are spelled out and monitored, including Israel’s duties to facilitate recovery. Oversight is strengthened via independent monitors and regular reviews, and the geographic and sectoral scope is broadened to prevent fragmentation.
Most importantly, this mutual accountability framework shifts the paradigm to one of partnership and trust-building. Each side gains assurance that their actions will be met with reciprocal good-faith steps by the others, breaking the vicious cycle of mistrust. As noted above, without holding all parties mutually accountable, the reconstruction process will remain disconnected from realities on the ground. By contrast, a well-designed MAF reconnects commitments with outcomes: it ties aid to governance, security to freedom of movement, and international support to local ownership. Over time, this can create a pattern of positive reinforcement – a “virtuous cycle” – where meeting mutual obligations becomes the norm. That atmosphere is exactly what’s needed to not only rebuild Gaza, but also to revive prospects for a broader peace. In sum, the Mutual Accountability Framework is not a silver bullet for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but it is a practical and principled roadmap to ensure the post-war transition lays a foundation for sustainable peace and Palestinian self-determination, rather than repeating past failures. It offers a path to move forward together, with transparency, fairness, and shared purpose, in the hardest of circumstances.
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