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In this short blog, Dr Gregory Wilson of Developmentum, looks at some of the ‘lessons’ from past military operations in situations of fragility and conflict.
Four months after the President Trump imposed ceasefire in Gaza, there is no sign of who will be on the “Board of Peace”, only a rumour that Tony Blair will not be a member of the Board and that Sir Keir Starmer may receive an invitation. Consequently, we are also faced with a delay in the standing up the International Stabilisation Force (ISF) authorised by UNSC 2803. Moreover, the details of the ISF, its composition, command and mandate, is delaying the planning and deployment. The fundamental disagreements over the force’s mandate were expected; will the peace ‘enforcement’ role apply also to breaches of the agreements by Israel and as well as the necessity to disarm Hamas? Which nations are prepared to stand up, take responsibility and commit their troops? Can any progress be made at all in the absence of a comprehensive political agreement with the consent of all local parties? Indeed, why would any country want to put its military and police in harm’s way without a clear, achievable mandate and the necessary political backing?
It may be worth looking closer at some of the lessons learned in past foreign military deployments into situations of fragility and conflict, where the objective has been to stabilise insecurity and then support reconstruction and recovery. The UK has been involved in a number of these operations; Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Sierra Leone. What have we learned from these operations? As luck would have it, the UK Ministry of Defence published a short guide in 2018 entitled ‘The Good Operation’ – A handbook for those involved in operational policy and its implementation[1]. The handbook drew upon the findings of the Chilcot Inquiry and other UK interventions, and personal first-hand experience of commanders, civil servants and their implementing partners. It is fair to say that the handbook is rooted in known failures where the UK government and its allies failed to meet its objectives on the ground. It is a particularly useful document because it distils some painful lessons into readable common sense 10 lessons for future operations. The handbook, in short, consists of rigorous thinking, honest advice, political clarity and sustained challenge throughout the life of an operation. Whilst this sounds like ‘mom and apple pie’ advice, when applied to Gaza they ring loud and all too clear to palm away.
1. Be Clear About Purpose and Success
The mandate is still not defined. The handrail determines that the interests at stake should be laid bare, with a clear definition of what success looks like politically and strategically defined. Objectives should be realistic, prioritised and revisited whenever conditions change.
2. Understand the Context Deeply
Without full access to Gaza for all international personnel, continuously denied by the Israeli government, there can be no international ‘ground truthing’ of the conditions. The handrail states that early and continuous investment in political, social, cultural and economic understanding of the operating environment to avoid over-simplified narratives or assumptions about local actors.
3. Challenge Assumptions and Avoid Groupthink
The US Administration has not been acting in a participatory manner. This has made active and constructive challenges, dissent and red teaming within policy and decision-making processes impossible. The handbook states that the leadership of any transition process must create an environment where challenge is expected, not discouraged.
4. Explore a Genuine Range of Options
The estimates of the damage caused by the conflict and past experience suggests that engagement in Gaza will require financial and human resources beyond what is currently assessed. Always develop and present multiple credible options, including the option of not intervening or disengaging. Be honest about costs, risks, trade-offs and second-order effects for each option. Avoid “single option” submissions that mask political or institutional preferences.
5. Ensure Legal and Ethical Foundations Are Sound
The Gaza conflict has proven be an ethical and legal nightmare for the international community and significant court cases related to the situation in Gaza are currently ongoing at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court (ICC). Legal advice should be integrated early, not treated as a late-stage validation exercise. Understand both domestic and international legal implications, including long-term consequences. Ethical considerations are central to legitimacy and sustainability, not optional extras.
6. Align Ends, Ways and Means
See point 4 above. If aims are not realistic then it will be impossible to match objectives (ends) with methods (ways) and resources (means). The handbook advises being explicit about what the international community can and cannot resource over time and recognising that under-resourcing an operation is a strategic choice with consequences, not a neutral constraint.
7. Think Beyond the Military Instrument
Past peace initiatives have faltered, due in large part due to a lack of mutual accountability on each side’s obligations to end hostilities and the inherent power asymmetry between Israel and Palestine makes this likely to be the result of the current process. Unless the latter is resolved, the military instrument alone will not deliver the desired outcomes. The lessons learned from before, are that military force alone rarely delivers enduring political outcomes. Effective operations require a whole-of-government approach, integrating diplomacy, development, intelligence, economic tools and communications. In the case of Gaza Recovery, this must be a whole of international community effort. Coordination must be actively managed, not assumed.
8. Plan for the Long Term, Including Exit
As things stand, with a reconstruction timescale of a generation, perhaps 30 years, what does an ‘exit’ look like? As the handbook states, consider how the operation might evolve, escalate, de-escalate or end. Plan early for transition, stabilisation and exit, even when timelines are uncertain. Avoid open-ended commitments without clear political oversight.
9. Governance and Decision-Making Matter
The current set of circumstances suggests that decision making is in the hands of a few individuals that care not for accountability and a positive, equitable peace. Decisions should be taken at the right level, with clear accountability and documentation. Ensure that advice to ‘ministers’ (principals) is balanced, transparent and evidence based. Good process does not guarantee good outcomes, but poor process greatly increases the risk of failure.
10. Monitor, Learn and Adapt
Currently, there are no processes or measures in place that suggest performance and effectiveness can be monitored and adapted as necessary. As learnt from previous experiences, transition requires the establishment of measures of performance and effectiveness from the outset (as is currently being done by European powers in Ukraine). Continuously assess whether assumptions remain valid and objectives achievable. Be willing to adapt or stop an operation when evidence shows it is not delivering intended outcomes.
In sum, based on the guidance above and what we know about the ISF, it is unclear if any of these steps have been adequately addressed. The Military Commander would be advised to look again at the steps in terms of preparing the ground. The International Community should also offer this warning to the US and Israel – if you do not heed the guidance, a ‘good operation’ in Gaza looks far from certain.
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